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Abstract. We study the price effects of consolidation in the car rental industry using three
cross-sections of price data from U.S. airport markets spanning the years 2005 to 2016. The
auto rental industry went through a series of mergers during this period, leading to
a significant increase in market concentration. We find that the concentration of ownership
affects the business (weekday) and leisure (weekend) segments differently. Average
weekday prices rose by 2.1% and weekend prices fell by 3.3% with the increase in market
concentration. Given the periodic differences in demand from business and leisure
travelers, we explain this finding with a model of horizontal product differentiation that
allows for heterogeneity in customer types and firms’marginal costs. Consolidation leads
to marginal cost savings, but the extent to which these savings are passed onto different
customer types depends on the magnitude of switching costs. In particular, weekday
customers with high switching costs are charged higher prices because of suppliers’
augmented market power whereas the more price-sensitive weekend segment enjoys the
lower prices facilitated by efficiency gains. Our findings highlight that consolidation can
have differential welfare effects on different customer groups and merger analyses should
account for the heterogeneous impact based on firms’ price discrimination practices rather
than just considering average effects.
History:Avi Goldfarb served as the senior editor and CarlMela served as associate editor for this article.
Supplemental Material: Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2018.1103.
Keywords: market concentration • mergers • market power • cost efficiencies • price discrimination
When examining possible adverse competitive effects
from a merger, the Agencies consider whether those
effects vary significantly for different customers pur-
chasing the same or similar products.
—Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. Department
of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
1. Introduction
Most industries consolidate as they mature with larger
but fewer remaining firms. In their long-term analysis of
mergers around the globe, Deans et al. (2002) show that
industries generally progress predictably through a clear
consolidation process. Recently, there are indications that
this trend is accelerating: Globally, the annual number of
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) doubled in the past two
decades (Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions & Alliances
2017). In theUnited States, the share of GDP generated by
the largest 100 companies increased from 33% in 1994
to 46% in 2013 (Berkeley 2016). In parallel, concentration
increased in two thirds of U.S. industries between 1997
and 2012with the combined share of the top four firms in
each sector rising from 26% to 32% (Koen 2016).
Consolidation may potentially improve welfare if
merging firms create cost efficiencies when their
operations are combined. These are mostly fixed cost
efficiencies, such as reductions in overhead, ration-
alization of assets and production facilities, or pro-
motional and marketing efficiencies (Coate and
Heimert 2009). Also, firms can achieve variable cost
savings in production, management, and distribution
that allow marginal cost reductions, which can be
passed on to customers in the form of lower prices. At
the same time, however, the drop in the number of
market players may increase firms’market power, and
prices may increase as a result. A series of studies have
documented price effects in both directions for mergers
in the airline (Borenstein 1990, Kim and Singal 1993),
banking (Focarelli and Panetta 2003), health insurance
(Dafny et al. 2012), mortgage (Allen et al. 2014), and
retail (Houde 2012, Ashenfelter et al. 2015) industries.
The strategic implication of mergers and acquisitions
has been long studied in the marketing literature (e.g.,
Capron and Hulland 1999, Sorescu et al. 2007, and
Swaminathan et al. 2008; see Yu 2013, table 1 for a list of
28 papers that have considered M&As in top marketing
journals). Within this literature, a stream of research
considers the implications for pricing with changes in
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market structure. A change in market structure could
includemergers, entry of a new firm or exit of an existing
firm, a change in firm policy, or changes in govern-
ment regulation (e.g., Eliashberg and Jeuland 1986, Balto
2001, Chintagunta et al. 2003, Dube 2005, Homburg
and Bucerius 2005, Nijs et al. 2013, Nishida 2014, and
Ozturk et al. 2016). Here the changes to pricing
resulting from changes in market structure are esti-
mated using policy simulations, surveys, or direct ob-
servation. This area of research is of interest to managers
and policy makers. For managers, it provides both pre-
scriptive and descriptive information on how prices
should change after a change inmarket structure.We add
to the marketing literature by showing the heteroge-
neous impact of mergers on different consumer seg-
ments, therefore suggesting thatmarketing, with detailed
information about consumer preference, should be in-
volved when assessing how the merger will impact the
firm’s price structure over its distribution of customers.
Our study focuses on an industry with periodic shifts
in the composition of customers and in which firms can
exploit these shifts to vary the prices offered to different
customer segments. Using a simple theoretical model
based on extensions of the Salop (1979) model of hori-
zontal product differentiation that allow for heteroge-
neous marginal costs (Syverson 2004, Vogel 2008, Lin
and Wu 2015), we show that the net price effect of
a merger may periodically change sign. When serving
the customer segmentwith high switching costs (because
of high search costs or higher brand loyalty), the market
power effect dominates; firms can profitably increase the
price charged to this customer segment as competitive
intensity drops. For customers that more easily switch
suppliers, on the other hand, the decline in the number of
market players does not effectively translate into higher
prices, and the pricemay, in fact, decrease because of cost
efficiencies facilitated by the merger.
We document these effects using data from airport
car rental markets, focusing on differences in week-
day and weekend pricing. Between these two pe-
riods, there is a change in the relative demand by
business and leisure travelers with the less price-
sensitive business travelers increasing in proportion
during the weekdays and leisure travelers during the
weekends (Stavins 2001, Clemons et al. 2002, Gerardi
and Shapiro 2009).
We collect price data from three distinct time periods
spanning more than a decade: 2005, 2009, and 2016.
The industry went through a major consolidation
phase during this period (Figure 1) with two major
acquisition events: in 2007, Enterprise acquired Alamo-
National and became the second largest player in the
airport markets, and in 2012, Hertz, the market leader,
acquired Dollar-Thrifty, one of the five largest firms
in the industry. Additionally, the sample period covers
other ownership changes involving relatively smaller
companies: Hertz’s acquisition and subsequent di-
vestiture of Advantage (in 2009 and 2012, respec-
tively) as well as Avis-Budget’s acquisition of Payless
(in 2013). Hence, differently from most of the pre-
vious literature that focuses on a single merger event
with possibly idiosyncratic effects, we observe rich
variation in ownership structure induced by a series
of mergers.
Our empirical analysis is based on the differential
price effects of the number of independent firms (i.e.,
owners) in the market versus the number of affiliate
firms not independently owned. This approach al-
lows us to flexibly account for any type of market
structure change, such as a merger, entry/exit by
an independent/affiliate player, or a divestiture. We
exploit the panel structure of our data to conduct
a difference-in-difference test of the price effects of
consolidation, controlling for a rich set of airport-,
firm-, and rental period–level fixed characteristics
that may make market structure endogenous to price.
Given that mergers in our data occur at the national
level, they generate local market structure changes
that are independent of local profitability shocks.
As the number of owners increases, the market be-
comes more competitive, and we should expect aver-
age markups to fall. At the same time, affiliate firms
can also affect prices, either by enhancing competi-
tiveness (by extending the owner’s reach to customer
segments in which competition was potentially less
intense previously) or through cost efficiencies that the
combined firm achieves with a larger scale of opera-
tion.1 If there is no price effect of the number of owners,
our model predicts that customers’ supplier switching
costs and, hence, average markups are low. For this
case, we conjecture that the market power effect can be
ruled out, and the price effect of an affiliate firm, if it
exists, reflects the cost efficiencies enabled by affiliation.
In our data, we find that, although the loss of an in-
dependent player causes weekday prices to rise by 5.4%,
no such effect is observed on weekend prices. However,
Figure 1. (Color online) Ownership Changes
Note. Circles indicate merger events.
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weekend prices do respond to the number of affiliate
firms, which suggests the price-lowering effect of cost
efficiency gains. Specifically, we estimate the downward
price effect of an affiliate firm to be approximately 3.3%
for both the weekday and weekend periods.
Our formulation characterizes a merger between two
firms as the change of an independent player of the
market into an affiliate firm. Our estimates suggest that
this change causes weekday prices to rise by 2.1% (p =
0.05) and the weekend prices to fall by 3.3% (p = 0.01).
Thus, postmerger, the less price-sensitive weekday
segment faces a price increase in the net (despite the
cost efficiency gains). In contrast, the weekend seg-
ment, which is immune to market power, enjoys the
lower prices facilitated by efficiency gains.We document
a parallel effect in the pricing differences between
business segment–focused versus leisure segment–
focused firms as well as holiday versus regular airports,
reinforcing the price-discrimination explanation of our
findings.
These empirical results, in line with our theoretical
model, provide evidence that the heterogeneity in
customers’ price sensitivity plays a pivotal role in de-
termining the welfare implications of consolidation in
a horizontally differentiated industry. We show that the
effect can vary across different customer groups and
highlight the importance of taking account of customer
heterogeneity in merger analysis, noting that firms can
sort customers based on the timing of their demand.
Our data set builds on Singh and Zhu (2008), who
conduct a cross-sectional analysis of the effect of market
structure on prices in the industry. Data used in Singh
and Zhu (2008) correspond to the weekday portion
of our 2005 cross-section. Broadly, our study is related
to the growing literature on mergers’ price effects
(e.g., Borenstein 1990; Dafny et al. 2012; Houde 2012;
Ashenfelter et al. 2013, 2015). Several of these studies
aim to separate the market-power and cost-efficiency
effects by making use of temporal (Kim and Singal
1993, Focarelli and Panetta 2003) or geographical
(Ashenfelter et al. 2015) differences in their relative
magnitudes. The former two papers, which exploit the
time variation, compare the mergers’ short- and long-
term price effects on the conjecture that cost effi-
ciencies would take longer to materialize. In our case,
the price variation we focus on is also temporal but
periodic (i.e., between the weekday and weekend
periods), and our identification relies on the differential
price effects of the same market structure change on
consumer segments with different price sensitivity.
We explain the difference in mergers’ effects on
weekday versus weekend pricing through differences in
customer switching costs across the periods. This ties
our analysis to the stream of theoretical work on the
relationship between switching costs and the market’s
competitiveness (see Klemperer 1995 for a review). This
literature shows that switching costs are generally
expected to increase firms’ market power and hence
prices.2 Our results are also in line with a set of recent
studies that document a decrease in price discrimina-
tion as markets become more competitive. Gerardi and
Shapiro (2009) show that price dispersion in the U.S.
airline industry declines with competitive entry, and
this change is driven by a decline in the top portion
of the price distribution.3 Similarly, Gaggero and Piga
(2011) report evidence from UK airfare data that
competition is likely to hinder firms’ ability to price
discriminate. These papers concentrate on the price
effects of firm entries and exits whereas, in the current
study, the focus is instead on the ownership changes
generated by mergers.4
Other than their implications for merging firms and
merger regulation, results from the study may be of in-
terest to managers of nonmerging firms operating in
consolidating industries. Our findings suggest firms
targeting the more price-conscious customers in these
industries should prepare for more intense price compe-
tition, such as by simplifying their services and rational-
izing their cost structure. On the other hand, price
increases at the high end may shift the focus of com-
petition in this segment toward quality, urging firms to
improve their product/service offerings to justify the
higher prices.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2
presents our theoretical model. Section 3 describes
our empirical strategy to test the price effects of market
and ownership structure. Section 4 provides background
information on the industry and introduces the data used
in the analysis. In Section 5, we present and discuss our
findings, and in Section 6, we conclude with a summary
and general discussion.
2. Theory
Wemake use of a simple illustrativemodel to lay out the
insights that guide our empirical analysis. Building on
Salop’s model of horizontal product differentiation
(Salop 1979), we derive price as an additive function of
the firm’s marginal cost and market power. Market
power, in turn, is determined by customers’ switching
costs and the market’s competitive intensity, that is,
number of players. To account for cost efficiency gains
for merging firms, we make use of results from exten-
sions of the Salop model that introduce heterogeneity in
firms’ marginal costs (Syverson 2004, Vogel 2008, Lin
and Wu 2015).
We consider a setup in which, based on the timing of
their demand, the firm can set different prices to two
customer segments with different levels of switching
costs (or price sensitivity). In this respect, our setup is
similar to Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989), who
study third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly mar-
kets. The model shows that, although consolidation
Guler et al.: Heterogeneous Price Effects of Consolidation
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drives down the marginal cost uniformly, the change
in market power depends on segments’ switching costs.
Therefore, depending on which customer group is
predominant in the market, temporal differences
are observed in the price impact of consolidation.
This result offers an explanation for the weekday
versus weekend pricing differentials in the car rental
industry.
2.1. Salop Model with Heterogeneous Costs
We assume customers are uniformly located along
a circle of unit circumference with linear transport
costs t> 0. These transport costs may represent any
costs associated with switching to a new supplier,
such as transaction/contractual costs, learning costs,
or accrued loyalty program benefits (Klemperer 1987).
Each consumer has inelastic demand for one unit of
output and purchases from the supplier that charges
the lowest location-adjusted price. Here, supplier
denotes an independent price setter (i.e., owner), which
may indicate a stand-alone firm or a parent company
operating multiple brands. By this, we assume that
switching costs are low or null within affiliate brands
of the same parent company and essentially take effect
when switching across different owners.We assume that
there are n > 1 such suppliers located equidistantly
with each supplier i incurring a constant marginal
production cost ci (uniform across all its brands). For
this setup, Lin and Wu (2015) show that a decrease in
any one of the supplier’s marginal cost leads to a lower
equilibrium price for all suppliers, with the expected
equilibrium price in the market given by5
E(pi)  tn + E(ci). (1)
Hence, price is a separable function of the average
marginal cost and a markup that measures market
power. Market power decreases in the number of sup-
pliers and increases with consumers’ transport cost t.
A decrease in any supplier’s marginal cost drives down
the equilibrium price.
2.2. Price Effects of Consolidation
Assume that with consolidation, the number of sup-
pliers falls to n9< n. Under the consolidated market
structure, the new equilibrium price is E(pi9) 
t
n9 + E(ci9), and the merger-induced price shift can be
written as
Δp  E(pi9) − E(pi)  t
(
1
n9
− 1
n
)
+ E(ci9) − E(ci). (2)
We denote the demand-side effect (market power ef-
fect) asΔd  t( 1n9 − 1n). Because 1n9 − 1n> 0 and t> 0,Δd> 0;
consolidation increases suppliers’ market power, in-
ducing upward pressure on prices.
At the same time, because of factors such as learning
and cost synergies, we assume that consolidation gen-
erates marginal cost savings among merging firms, and
consequently, the average marginal cost in the market
falls. We denote this drop by Δc  E(ci9) − E(ci)< 0.
As the price effect of consolidation is positive on the
demand side (Δd> 0) and negative on the cost side
(Δc< 0), the sign of Δp depends on the relative mag-
nitudes of Δd and Δc.
2.3. Customer Segments and Periodic
Demand Shifts
The market is made up of two customer segments
denoted high and low, s∈ {h, l}. Customer types h and
l differ in their transport costs (th > tl), and they de-
mand the good at two distinct periods w ∈ {h, l}, in
a recurring pattern based on the time of day, week,
or year.
Dh 
{
1 if w  h
0 if w  l , D
l 
{
0 if w  h
1 if w  l . (3)
We assume that suppliers’ marginal cost does not
vary between the periods. Under these conditions,
price movements resulting from consolidation are
given by
Δp  E(pi9) − E(pi) 
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
th
(
1
n9
− 1
n
)
+ Δc if w  h
tl
(
1
n9
− 1
n
)
+ Δc if w  l
.
(4)
We emphasize the following results from the model,
which guide our empirical analysis:
(1) Cost efficiencies (Δc) do not depend on the type of
customer served and have the same magnitude across
w∈ {h, l}.
(2) Given that th > tl, the high segment that has high
brand switching costs faces a bigger (smaller) price rise
(drop); that is, with consolidation, price increases more
(or decreases less) in w  h.
(3) For any given value of n and n9, there exists tˆ such
that if t  tˆ, Δp  0. For tl < tˆ and th > tˆ, we have
Δp 
{
> 0 if w  h
< 0 if w  l , whereby, in the net, consolida-
tion causes prices to increase in one period and decrease
in the other, depending on the customer segment served.
Translating these results to our empirical setting, by
result (1), we expect the cost efficiencies to impact the
weekday and weekend prices in the same manner. On
the other hand, because the market power varies in
strength depending on segments’ transport costs, as per
result (2), the net price effect of amerger will differ across
the two periods. Specifically, for the business segment
Guler et al.: Heterogeneous Price Effects of Consolidation
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with high switching costs, consolidationwill have amore
adverse (or less beneficial) effect compared with leisure
customers. Result (3) states that there is a threshold level
of transport costs for which the net price effect of the
merger will be zero, implying that if the business cus-
tomers’ loyalty is sufficiently high and the leisure seg-
ment’s loyalty is sufficiently low, themergerwill increase
prices for the former customer group (i.e., weekday) and
decrease it for the latter (weekend).
3. Empirical Strategy and Predictions
Our empirical analysis of the price implications of
market and ownership structure relies on the differential
price effects of the number of independent players
(owners) in the market versus the number of affiliate
firms not independently owned. Given two firms that
are co-owned; if both are active in a market, we count
them as one owner and one affiliate firm. This approach
allows us to flexibly account for any possible market
structure change, such as the entry or exit of an in-
dependent or an affiliate firm, a merger or a split. The
following table summarizes how we account for these
changes. A merger of two firms within the market re-
sults in an independent player (i.e., owner) becoming an
affiliate with the number of owners decreasing and
number of affiliates increasing by one.
A market’s competitiveness mainly depends on the
number of owners, that is, independent price setters. As
the number of independent players decreases through
mergers, the remaining players will have more market
power, and the averagemarkup in themarketwill go up.
At the same time, an affiliate firm, although not in-
dependently owned, can also have a price-lowering
effect. This could happen in twoways. First, the affiliate
firm can enhance the owner’s competitive impact, for
instance, by allowing the owner to more effectively
target a new customer segment.6 Second, by facilitating
scale economies or learning, affiliation can bring down
the joint firm’s average marginal costs, enabling price
reductions.7 In this latter case, the affiliate firm count
acts as a measure of average merger-induced cost ef-
ficiencies in the market (Δc).
For our empirical setting, we make use of the fol-
lowing general regression model to test these effects:
ln (pricewimct)  βwownersnowners,mt + βwaff inaff i,mt + βwmmsize
+ βwim + βwit + βwct + +εwimct,
(5)
where i indexes firm, m indexes market (airport),
c indexes car type, and t indexes year. Our dependent
variable is the log of daily price. We estimate the model
separately for the weekday and weekend periods,
indexed by w. The market structure variables nowners
and naff i denote, respectively, the number of owners and
affiliate firms in market m in year t.8 Our main co-
efficients of interest are βwowners and β
w
aff i, which measure
the weekday- and weekend-specific price response to
market structure. We allow for a rich set of controls.
Airports’ monthly passenger traffic accounts for market
size. In addition, we have airport × firm, firm × rental
period, and car type × rental period–level fixed effects.
Airport–firm fixed effects control for the branch-level
(e.g., Avis in ORD airport) unobservables that are
constant across the data years.9 For instance, if the
acquiring firm undertakes the merger with a view to
strengthen its weaker branches, there could be cor-
relation between the pricing power at a given branch
and its probability of “being treated” by the merger.
The branch-level fixed effects account for such corre-
lation. Car type × rental period effects account for
demand differences for different car types across dif-
ferent rental periods. In our data, such differences may
arise as rental dates of the price data in the three cross-
sections belong to different calendar months. Finally,
firm × rental period fixed effects control for firm-level
price changes common to all branches within a rental
period, allowing us to focus on the pricing effect of local
market structure changes.10
We expect both βowners and βaff i to be smaller than or
equal to zero; that is, price does not rise with the num-
ber of active firms. As βowners captures the market
power effect, the expectation is that βowners < 0, that is,
markups and, hence, prices decrease in nowners. If
βowners  0, we infer that price does not respond
to changes in nowners. As per our theoretical model, in
which the merger-induced change in markup is given by
Δd  t( 1n’ − 1n), this suggests that brand switching costs (t)
are null/low. Accordingly, firms enjoy nomarket power,
and market prices are at the competitive levels.11
Our other coefficient of interest, βaff i, could have
a nonzero (negative) value, because it captures (i) the
additional competitive impact imposed by an affiliate
firm on the market’s prices and/or (ii) the merger-
induced cost efficiency gains. If βowners < 0 we cannot
differentiate between these two mechanisms; given that
the number of owners (independent competitors) does
exert downward pressure on prices, the price effect of
affiliate firms can arise both because they contribute to
the markets’ competitive intensity and because their
presence indicates cost efficiencies. On the other hand,
in case βowners  0, the market power effect is ruled out.
Therefore, under the scenario that βowners  0 and
βaf f i < 0, we deduce that βaff i reflects the cost effi-
ciencies from merging.
In a market in which the merging firms were both
active before the merger, our formulation gives the
merger’s price effect as the difference in the price effects
of an affiliate firm versus an independent player, βaff i −
βowners (initially there are two independent players;
postmerger there is one independent player and one
Guler et al.: Heterogeneous Price Effects of Consolidation
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affiliate firm). As we expect both terms to be weakly
negative, if |βowners | > |βaff i |, we deduce that the merger’s
net price effect is positive; the market power effect
dominates any cost efficiencies, and price rises as a result.
On the other hand, if |βowners | < |βaff i |, the reverse is true;
cost efficiencies dominate, and the merger’s net price
effect is negative.
4. Industry Background and Data
Car rental is a $27.1 billion market in the United States
(Auto Rental News 2016). The industry comprises three
large parent companies: Hertz Global Holdings Inc.,
Avis Budget Group Inc., and Enterprise Holdings Inc.
These firms, which have grown to their current size
through acquisitions, together account for 95% of the
market (Duprey 2013). The industry witnessed two
major acquisitions in the past decade: in 2007, Enter-
prise acquired Alamo-National, and in 2013, Hertz
acquired Dollar-Thrifty. In both cases, the merging
firms were among the sector’s five largest companies.
Additionally, in this period there were other ownership
changes of smaller scale with Hertz’s acquisition and
subsequent divestiture of Advantage (in 2009 and 2012,
respectively), and Avis-Budget’s acquisition of Payless
in 2013. These market structure changes are summa-
rized in Table 1 and Figure 1.
Because of its potentially adverse effects on prices and
consumer welfare, the increasing concentration of own-
ership in the industry has been a cause for concern:
Consolidation shrinks the rows on ourmarket data chart
in our Fact Book once again. Our 1999 Fact Book, which
had 32 rows for 32 separate companies. . . . [T]his year’s
Fact Book has 11 companies. Amid the continued cries
of “oligopoly,” the fear is that car rental rates will climb
and, with less competition, the customer will suffer.
(Brown 2013)
Our data comes from the years 2005, 2009, and 2016
and, in terms of timing, allows us to observe rich var-
iation in firm ownership induced by the industry’s
consolidation trend. We focus on car rental businesses
in 343 U.S. commercial airports.12 An advantage of fo-
cusing on airport markets is that they allow a clean
market definition. This is not the case in most other
retail industries in which firms and consumers are
spread across a contiguous geography and, hence,
difficult to assign into distinct markets (Hosken and
Tenn 2016). Additionally, with airports, we have a
good estimate of market size based on the airport’s
passenger traffic volume. Price data are collected
from Orbitz and Expedia websites and virtually cover
all airports at which car rental service is available.13
Across 343 airports, the panel includes a weekday and
a weekend (two dates) price for a range of 27 firms and
five car types in 2005, 2009, and 2016 (three years). This
results in 54,024 observations that we use for estimation.
In terms of customer type, the car rental business
is segmented into business and leisure. These segments
are roughly of similar size; in 2014, the business seg-
ment accounted for 53.8% of all travelers worldwide
(Future Market Insights 2015). Compared with leisure
customers, business travelers tend to exhibit higher
loyalty to a particular airline; surveys show that in their
purchase decisions they prioritize rewards programs
over price (Boehmer 2012). Given that business cus-
tomers’ demand is less elastic, travel companies attempt
to increase their profits by price discriminating between
the business and leisure segments (McAfee 2008). A
common method to differentiate between the two
types of customers is the requirement of a “Saturday-
night stay” as the demand of business travelers is
concentrated onweekdays and that of leisure travelers
on weekends.
For every airport–year pair, our data includes a week-
day and a weekend price observation for each firm and
car type. Thus, our unit of observation is a firm–airport-
year–car type–time of week (weekday or weekend). For
instance, the Avis weekend price for a midsized car at
the ORD airport in year 2009 would be a representative
data point in our sample. The data collection and pickup
and drop-off dates for our three cross-sections are
shown in Table 2.14 In total, we observe prices for six
rental periods with a weekday and a weekend price for
each year of the data.Weekday prices are for aMonday
to Tuesday rental, and weekend prices reflect the daily
rates for a Friday to Monday rental.15 We conduct our
analyses on price data for five major rental car types.
These are economy, compact, midsize, standard, and
full. To show the variation in the raw data, in Figure 2
we plot the variation in prices by airport (across firm)
and by firm (across airports). Here we show that, in
our data, prices do vary within airports and rental car
companies.
Table 3 presents the firms’ market coverage and the
summary statistics of the variables that go into our re-
gressions separately for each year of the data. Compared
with weekdays, weekend prices are lower by at least
30% across the different car types. During the sample
period, the average number of independent players
(owners) per market drops from 4.13 to 3.06, and the
affiliate firm count (i.e., the number of firms not
Table 1. Data Timeline
Date Change
March 2005 Price data
August 2007 Enterprise acquired Alamo-National
March 2009 Hertz acquires Advantage
November 2009 Price data
November 2012 Hertz acquires Dollar-Thrifty, divests Advantage
July 2013 Avis-Budget acquires Payless
April 2016 Price data
Guler et al.: Heterogeneous Price Effects of Consolidation
6 Marketing Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–19, © 2019 INFORMS
independently owned, calculated as the total number
of firms in the market minus the number of owners)
increases more than twofold from 1.43 to 2.96. These
changes reflect the consolidation trend in the industry;
increasingly, markets are served by more firms operated
by a smaller owner base. Actually, as of 2016, a large
majority of the markets have become a three-player
oligopoly (Figure 3).
Table A.1 tabulates the changes in number of owners
and affiliate firms. There is high premerger overlap in
merging firms’ portfolio of markets (Table A.2). Be-
fore merging, Enterprise was active in 197 (90.0%)
of the markets where Alamo and/or National were
present. Likewise, Hertz was active in 118 (96.7%) of
the markets where Dollar and/or Thrifty were present.
This overlap indicates the large extent of markets af-
fected by a merger. Data shows significant variation
in merger- versus entry-/exit-related market structure
changes (Figure A.1).
The differences in weekday versus weekend pricing
summarized in Figure 4 give an indication of our main
results: compared with the weekend period, weekday
prices are more responsive to changes in the number
of owners. On the other hand, there is no significant
difference between weekdays and weekends in the
price response to the number of affiliate firms.16
5. Results
To measure the competition and ownership effects,
our regressions make use of the price variation within
an airport–firm pair across the three cross-sections in
our data. All our specifications include airport–firm
fixed effects, and our standard errors are clustered at
this level, allowing for heteroscedasticity and arbi-
trary correlations in the error term within a branch
over car types and data years. Additionally, as explained
in Section 3, our regressions control for airports’ yearly
passenger traffic levels as well as firm × rental period
and car type × rental period fixed effects. We ana-
lyze the weekday and weekend price movements
separately.
Table 4 presents our main results. Specification 1
reported in this table does not account for co-ownership;
that is, it treats owners and affiliate firms symmetri-
cally. Under this specification, we find that an addi-
tional firm has a price-lowering effect of 4.5% in the
weekday period and 1.4% in the weekend period.
Overall, weekday prices appear to bemore responsive to
the market’s total firm count.
Importantly, we find that co-ownership changes
firms’ price impact (Table 4, specification 2). In the
weekday period, entry by an independent firm draws
down the averagemarket price by 5.4%. In comparison,
the price impact of an affiliate firm is lower by 2%.
For the weekend period, our results again indicate
a difference based on ownership: there is a price effect
of affiliate firms but not of independent players; the
price impact of an owner is measured to be virtually
zero, and the estimate is statistically insignificant. In
both weekday and weekend, the difference between
coefficient estimates of the owner and affiliate firm
Table 3. Data Description
Firm
Firms’ market coverage Summary statistics
2005 2009 2016 Variable 2005 2009 2016
Advantage 34 19 38
Alamo 191 186 195 Monthly traffic (millions) 0.16 0.14 0.15
Avis 288 284 298 (0.41) (0.35) (0.4)
Budget 226 225 266 Weekday price ($) 56.39 66.51 57.98
Dollar 117 108 136 (20.08) (27.06) (22.9)
Enterprise 271 243 257 Weekend price ($) 37.28 34.58 36.45
Hertz 309 313 306 (19.79) (13.88) (20.48)
National 219 210 233 Number of owners 4.13 3.13 3.06
Payless 27 19 75 (2.02) (1.27) (1.6)
Thrifty 128 109 132 Number of affiliate firms 1.43 2.01 2.96
Other 96 46 130 (1.15) (1.67) (2.2)
Notes. Sample statistics are computed over 343 airports, 27 firms, and five car types. Figures indicate the variable means.
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Table 2. Data Dates
Year Data collected on
Weekday rental Weekend rental
Pickup Drop-off Pickup Drop-off
2005 13-Mar 21-Mar 22-Mar 25-Mar 28-Mar
2009 11-Nov 16-Nov 17-Nov 20-Nov 23-Nov
2016 9-May 16-May 17-May 20-May 23-May
Notes. Data dates read as follows. For instance, the 2005 price data
were collected on March 13, 2005, for (1) a weekday rental from
March 21, 2005, to March 22, 2005 (Monday to Tuesday) and (2)
a weekend rental from March 25, 2005, to March 28, 2005 (Thursday
to Monday).
Guler et al.: Heterogeneous Price Effects of Consolidation
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count variables is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Overall, these findings indicate that accounting for firm
co-ownership is important in studying the effect of
market structure on prices.
We fail to find an effect of the number of owners on
weekend prices, which indicates firms’ lack of market
power during the weekend period. Our model pro-
vides an explanation for this finding; with the leisure
segment that easily switches suppliers (i.e., low trans-
port costs t), weekend prices are already close to
competitive levels, and an additional player does not
contribute significantly to the market’s competitiveness.
This result allows us to distinguish between the two
possible mechanisms for the price effect of affiliate
firms as discussed in the previous section. Based on the
weekend findings with the market power explanation
ruled out, we conclude that the market’s affiliate firm
count reflects the cost efficiencies achieved through
merging (this corresponds to the case with βowners  0,
βaffi < 0). Note that our model predicts the extent of
cost savings to not vary between weekdays and week-
ends, so the documented cost savings are relevant to
both periods. Figure 5 provides a visualization of our
main findings. Consistently across the different car
types, it is only in the weekday period that price re-
sponds to the number of owners whereas the number
of affiliate firms has a price effect both on weekdays
and weekends.17
In Table 4, specification 3, we allow for differential
price effects for large airports (in terms of yearly
traffic) by interacting the number of owners and af-
filiate variables with a top 50 airport dummy. Here,
results exhibit the same pattern as in specification 2
with the interaction terms indicating market structure
effects of greater magnitude for large airports and,
hence, for the average customer who is more likely to
travel through these locations.18 Especially, the af-
filiate firm interaction term is significant, suggesting
larger cost efficiency gains at airports with heavier
traffic.
5.1. Differential Price Effects of
Ownership Concentration
Our formulation characterizes a merger event as the
transformation of an independent player of the
market into an affiliate firm. A merger’s price impact
then corresponds to the difference in the price effects
Figure 2. Distribution of Prices in the Raw Data
Note. Charts plot the distribution of daily rates by firm (for five major firms) and by 343 airports included in the estimation sample.
Figure 3. Number of Owners per Market
Note. The figure shows the distribution of the number of owners over
343 airport markets across the data years.
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of an owner versus an affiliate firm.19 Based on this
measure of ownership concentration, we find that, in
the net, a merger shifts prices in opposite directions
in the weekday and the weekend periods. Specifi-
cally, average prices increase during weekdays by
2.1% (p = 0.05) and decrease during weekends by
3.3% (p = 0.01) (Figure 6). Of the two consequences of
consolidation, our results suggest that the market
power effect dominates in the weekday period, and
the cost efficiency effect dominates in the weekend
period.
5.2. Robustness Checks
Allowing for Nonlinear Market Structure Effects. Speci-
fication 4 in Table 4 allows for nonlinear price ef-
fects of market structure with each market type (as
determined by its owner count) represented by a sepa-
rate dummy variable. In this specification, we take
a market with eight players (the maximum number of
players commonly observed across all three cross-
sections) to be the competitive benchmark. Compared
with that baseline, the elimination of each additional
player from the market causes a steady increase in the
price levels. Consistently with our previous findings,
the weekend price response to the number of market
players is much flatter compared with the weekday
period (Figure 7).
Different Data Splits to Identify Leisure vs. Business
Travelers. We explain the difference in consolidation-
induced price shifts between weekdays and weekends
by the change in relative demand by business versus
Figure 4. Model-Free Evidence of Differential Price Effects
Notes. Charts plot the percentage change in the averagemarket price against the change in the number of owners (column (1)) and the number of
affiliate firms (column (2)) for 343 airport markets in the estimation sample. Second row plots the weekday andweekend prices separately. Third
row plots the difference in percentage change in weekday versus weekend prices. Vertical bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
Guler et al.: Heterogeneous Price Effects of Consolidation
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leisure customers. If this is indeed true, we would
expect to find parallel price effects when data are split
along other dimensions that imply a similar sorting of
the two customer types. For instance, at holiday air-
ports with a larger percentage of leisure travelers at any
time of the week, we would expect the weekday price
increase to be less pronounced (i.e., the market power
effect to be relatively weaker) and the weekend price
drop to be more substantial. Likewise, we would ex-
pect firms charging lower prices, which are, in gen-
eral, more likely to be preferred by the price-sensitive
leisure segment, to exhibit a smaller price rise in the
weekday period and a larger decrease in the weekend
period. Figure 6 summarizes results based on these
splits.
As hypothesized, at holiday airports with a larger
proportion of leisure travelers, the market power effect
is weak/null (no weekday price increase), and the
weekend price decrease is larger compared with regular
airports. Leisure travelers, identified as holiday airport
customers, on average pay lower prices and are better
off with consolidation. On the other hand, business
customers, identified as weekday travelers at regular
airports, pay higher prices.
Firm-level results in Figure 6 are ordered by firms’
relative prices. Also, we group firms depending on
their main target customer group (business versus
leisure), as indicated in their annual reports. Because
with the firm-level split the number of observations
per regression decreases substantially, some of the
firm-level estimates do not reach significance. The
directions of the estimates still suggest a consistent
pattern: the top three most expensive firms that mainly
target business travelers (Hertz, National, and Avis)
generally raise their prices on both weekdays and
weekends, such that customers of these firms (less price-
sensitive customers comprising mostly business trav-
elers) are worse off overall. On the other hand, the
remaining firms, which mainly target the leisure segment,
offer lower prices on both weekdays and weekends.
Controlling for Airport-Year–Level Unobservables.
Table B.1 reports results from a regression that in-
cludes airport–firm–year fixed effects that control
Table 4. Main Results
Weekday Weekend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Firms −0.0446*** −0.0145**
(0.00567) (0.00598)
Number of Owners −0.0537*** −0.0415*** 0.0000772 0.00650
(0.00786) (0.00934) (0.00739) (0.00862)
Number of Affiliate Firms −0.0330*** −0.0125 −0.0386*** −0.0330*** −0.0221** −0.0350***
(0.00716) (0.00812) (0.00736) (0.00812) (0.00919) (0.00819)
Number of Owners_Top 50 Airports −0.0177 −0.00905
(0.0143) (0.0132)
Number of Affiliate Firms_Top 50 Airports −0.0492*** −0.0251**
(0.0106) (0.0117)
Dummy_1owner 0.533*** 0.195**
(0.0703) (0.0805)
Dummy_2owners 0.507*** 0.183***
(0.0609) (0.0565)
Dummy_3owners 0.492*** 0.120**
(0.0524) (0.0484)
Dummy_4owners 0.440*** 0.133***
(0.0492) (0.0440)
Dummy_5owners 0.307*** 0.0917**
(0.0450) (0.0408)
Dummy_6owners 0.197*** 0.0980***
(0.0421) (0.0375)
Dummy_7owners 0.0459 −0.0162
(0.0419) (0.0353)
Number of observations 26,772 26,772 26,772 26,772 27,242 27,242 27,242 27,242
Number of clusters 2,255 2,255 2,256 2,255 2,279 2,279 2,279 2,279
Adjusted R2 0.607 0.607 0.610 0.622 0.669 0.670 0.671 0.672
Notes. Figures indicate results of ordinary least squares regressions where the dependent variable is ln(daily rental rate). Estimation sample
includes price data for 2005, 2009, and 2016 over 343 airports, 27firms, andfive car types.All specifications control formonthly passenger traffic and
include car type× rental period, firm× rental period, airport× firm fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the airport× firm level.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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for unobservable factors that could make a firm’s
entry (or exit) more likely at an airport for a given year.20
Note that the within airport-year variation that this
specification exploits allows us to identify only the
time-of-week differential in the price effects of our
variables of interest (i.e., the difference in weekday-
period effects over the weekend-period effects). The
weekday–weekend effect differences we estimate under
this control (column (2)) are very similar to those sug-
gested by our benchmark model with only airport–firm
fixed effects (column (1)).
Estimating Mergers’ Price Effects Directly. Table B.2
provides results from an alternative regression that es-
timates themerger price effects directly through amerger
count variable, controlling for firm entries/exits. Esti-
mated effects are very similar to those based on our main
specification: on average, a merger raises weekday prices
by 3.4% (p = 0.01) and decreases weekend prices by 3.5%
(p = 0.01).
Measuring Concentration by the Herfindahl Index. In
Appendix C, we provide results from a robustness
check that measures market concentration based on
the Herfindahl index (HHI), given by the sum of
squared market shares of independent players. Be-
cause of data limitations we describe in the appendix,
we conduct this analysis on a subsample of 38 air-
ports from our actual estimation sample. Results
parallel our previous findings with consolidation af-
fecting weekday and weekend prices in opposite
directions.
6. Conclusion
Many industries across the world witness an ac-
celerating consolidation trend with ambiguous
welfare consequences. While the increase in firms’
market power is expected to lead to price increases,
mergers also allow cost savings that may allow
prices to drop. The present study demonstrates, for
a horizontally differentiated industry, the role of
customers’ supplier switching costs in determining
which of these opposing effects dominates. Con-
sidering a simple setup of an industry with periodic
differences in demand between customer segments
with varying supplier switching costs, we show that
there can arise periodic shifts in the price effects of
consolidation with prices rising only during the period
Figure 5. Price Impact of Owners and Affiliate Firms
Notes. Figures indicate the percentage price impact of a unit change in number of owners versus affiliate firms. In both the weekday and
weekend price regressions, observations are at the airport–firm–car type–year level. Detailed regression results are presented in Table 4 and
Table B.3.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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when the “high-switching cost” customer segment is
predominant in the market and falling otherwise.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the U.S. car rental
industry, which went through a major consolidation
phase over the past decade. To identify the impact of
consolidation on prices, we exploit the rich price var-
iation in the industry observed across years, car types,
airports, firms, and especially theweekday andweekend
Figure 7. Price Change with Consolidation
Notes. Vertical bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals. Eight-player market taken as benchmark.
Figure 6. Price Impact of a Merger
Notes. Figures indicate the percentage price response to a unit increase in the number of affiliate firms, total number of firms held constant. All
regressions control for the market’s total firm count and include car type × rental period, firm × rental period, airport × firm fixed effects. Detailed
regression results by destination type and firm are presented in Table B.4 and Table B.5, respectively.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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periods. We circumvent empirical challenges related
to product and market definition as (1) product types
(car types) are standard and directly comparable
across firms and (2) the airport markets that we focus
on are clearly demarcated in terms of the identity and
number of competitors. Controlling for firm-year
fixed effects, we focus on local price effects of mar-
ket structure and ownership changes (for instance, our
results would leave out the price effect of an updated
IT system that allows the firm to reduce prices in all
airports). We find that, on average, weekday prices
rise and weekend prices fall with ownership con-
centration. This is because the market power effect of
mergers overrides the cost efficiency effect only during
the weekday period when the (more loyal) business
customers are higher in proportion. Thus, we show
that, under price discrimination, consolidation can affect
customer groups differently, helping some customers
and hurting others.
Our results are important for policymakers as they
show that merger analysis should take account of the
possibility of such heterogeneous effects. We believe
our results are important to managers as they show
that a merger need not result in a fixed (absolute or
percentage) price change across all markets. A rental
car industry expert commented, in a private conver-
sation, that “the relative lack of commercial leader
involvement in [a recent rental car merger] is at least
part of the reason it took so long to for [the company]
to realize much benefit from the acquisition.” Our
results argue for marketing involvement early in the
merger process.
Appendix A. Additional Preliminary Analysis
Table A.2. Premerger Market Overlap
One if Enterprise is active
0 1 Total
One if Alamo and/or
National is active
0 50 74 124
1 22 197 219
Total 72 271 343
One if Dollar and/or One if Hertz is active
Thrifty is active
0 26 195 221
1 4 118 122
Total 30 313 343
Table A.1. Market Structure Changes
Change in
number
of owners
Change in number of affiliates
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total
−6 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
−5 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
−4 0 0 2 1 3 0 0 0 6
−3 0 1 1 9 5 0 0 0 16
−2 1 3 18 41 15 0 0 0 78
−1 0 9 61 103 38 8 0 0 219
0 0 9 174 57 43 6 1 0 290
1 0 3 22 13 9 3 1 1 52
2 0 0 1 5 8 0 1 0 15
3 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 4
4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Total 1 25 279 235 125 17 3 1 686
Guler et al.: Heterogeneous Price Effects of Consolidation
Marketing Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–19, © 2019 INFORMS 13
Figure A.2. Price Response to the Number of Owners vs. Affiliate Firms
Notes. Charts plot the percentage price change in our raw data against the change in the number of owners (column (1)) and the number of
affiliate firms (column (2)). Second row plots the weekday andweekend prices separately. Third row plots the difference in percentage change in
weekday versus weekend prices.
Figure A.1. Distribution of Merger- and Entry-/Exit-Related Market Structure Changes
Notes. Horizontal categories represent the number of market player entries/exits observed across the markets, and the shaded bars indicate the
number of mergers observed within each horizontal category. Data shows significant variation in merger- and entry-/exit-related market
structure changes.
Guler et al.: Heterogeneous Price Effects of Consolidation
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Appendix B. Additional Regression Results
In this appendix, we present detailed results for the re-
gression analyses that provide input to Figures 5 and 6 and
the robustness checks reported in Section 5.2.
Table B.1. Robustness Check—Controlling for Airport-
Year Fixed Effects
(1) (2)
Number of owners −0.00226
(0.00712)
Number of owners × weekday −0.0489*** −0.0506***
(0.00765) (0.00852)
Number of affiliate firms −0.0339***
(0.00774)
Number of affiliate firms × weekday 0.00245 0.00548
(0.00764) (0.00712)
Number of observations 54,014 54,014
Number of clusters 2,290 5,679
Adjusted R2 0.734 0.877
Notes. Figures indicate results of ordinary least squares regressions
where the dependent variable is ln(daily rental rate). Estimation
sample includes price data for 2005, 2009, and 2016 over 343
airports, 27 firms, and five car types. All specifications control for
time-of-week–interacted monthly passenger traffic and include car
type × rental period, firm × rental period fixed effects. Column (1)
includes airport × firm fixed effects. Column (2) includes airport ×
firm × year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at
the airport × firm (column (1)) and airport × firm × year (column (2))
level.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table B.2. Estimating Mergers’ Price Effects Directly
Weekday Weekend
Simulated number of owners
(excludes merger effects)
−0.0477*** −0.000871
(0.00858) (0.00804)
Simulated number of affiliates
(excludes merger effects)
−0.0487*** −0.0306***
(0.0103) (0.0111)
Merger effect 0.0344*** −0.0352***
(0.0117) (0.0125)
Number of observations 26,772 27,242
Number of clusters 2,255 2,279
Adjusted R2 0.608 0.670
Notes. Figures indicate results of ordinary least squares regressions
where the dependent variable is ln(daily rental rate). Simulated
number of owners and affiliates variables control for firm entries
and exits not related to a merger. Estimation sample includes price
data for 2005, 2009, and 2016 over 343 airports, 27 firms, and five car
types. All specifications control for monthly passenger traffic and
include car type × rental period, firm × rental period, airport × firm
fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the airport ×
firm level.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Appendix C. Measuring Concentration by the
HHI Index
The merger of two firms may result in different levels of
change in market power depending on their initial market
shares. To address this issue, this appendix provides results
based on the analysis of the price response to the market’s
Herfindahl index (HHI) given by the sum of squared market
shares of independent players.
We obtain airport-level market share data from Auto
Rental News (2003). Because of limitations of this data,
our HHI-based analysis has certain shortcomings. First, as
the data provide market shares for only the eight largest
firms in the industry (Alamo, Avis, Budget, Dollar Enter-
prise, Hertz, National, Thrifty), our HHI measures will omit
the impact of smaller firms. Consequently, our HHIs reflect
the two larger merger events covered in our data: the En-
terprise and Alamo-National merger (in 2007) and the Hertz
and Dollar-Budget merger (in 2013). Second, the share data
covers only the top 50 airport markets. Third, as we have
market share data only for 2003 and not for subsequent years,
we assume that throughout our sample period, firm-level
shares remained constant at their 2003 levels. Because of
these latter two limitations, we are able to focus on 38 airports
at which all of the top eight firms were active throughout our
sample period.21
Overall, the remaining subsample contains 11,637 data
points and corresponds to 20.7% of the full estimation sample.
For each market–year pair in this subsample, we predict the
HHI on an ownership basis, using the 2003 firm-level shares.
For instance, before the Enterprise and Alamo-National
merger, in a market in which Enterprise, Alamo, and Na-
tional were all active, contribution of the three firms to the
market’s HHI is calculated as ShareEnterprise
2 + (ShareAlamo+
ShareNational)
2. Postmerger, the combined HHI contribution is
calculated as (ShareEnterprise +ShareAlamo+ShareNational)
2. The
Hertz and Dollar-Thrifty merger is accounted for in the same
manner.
Figure C.1 shows the distribution of the HHI changes
induced by the two mergers. Across the subsample markets,
market concentration rises steadily during the sample period
with themeanHHI increasing from 2,538 (in 2005) to 2,734 (in
2009) and then to 3,371 (in 2016). According to the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, mergers resulting in highly
concentrated markets (with a premerger HHI of above 2500)
that involve an increase in the HHI of between 100 points and
200 points potentially raise significant competitive concerns
and often warrant scrutiny. Mergers resulting in highly
concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of
more than 200 points will be presumed to be likely to enhance
market power. Based on these criteria, merger-induced con-
centration changes are expected to enhance market power
significantly in a majority of the markets.
To analyze the price impact of HHI changes, we regress
market-firm–“car type”–“time of week” level log prices
against the market’s HHI level, allowing for the full set of
market-firm, rental period–car type and rental period–firm
level controls as in the main analysis. To reach statistical
power with this smaller subsample, we pool weekday and
weekend data, additionally allowing for weekend-interacted
effects of our controls and the HHI. Results presented in
Table C.1 confirm our previous findings on differential price
effects of mergers for weekday and weekend periods. For
instance, in response to themedian level of a 295-point increase
in the Herfindahl index, weekday prices rise by 12.8%, and
weekend prices drop by 6.5% in the subsample examined.22
Endnotes
1For example, these savings can come from centralizing back-office
functions, joint fleet management, or joint utilization of car return
facilities.
2Dubé et al. (2009) document that, in a dynamic context, the firm’s
customer acquisition motive may cause prices to decrease with the
level of switching costs.
3Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) highlight the importance of accounting
for time-invariant market-firm characteristics in analyzing the price
effects of competition. In particular, they show that cross-sectional
price data (as used in Borenstein and Rose 1994 and Stavins 2001)
without the time dimension may not suffice to control for omitted
variables correlated with market structure.
4A study that is similar to ours is Allen et al. (2014), who document
heterogeneous increases in mortgage rates following a merger
between two Canadian banks. They find that, under negotiated
prices, market concentration has the opposite effect, not affecting
the top end of the market and harming only the more price-sensitive
customers.
5 In a model that endogenizes firms’ location choices, Vogel (2008)
shows that, irrespective of where firms are located in the product
space, firm i’s price depends on another firm’s marginal cost only
through its impact on the average cost E(ci).
6For example, in the car rental industry, market analysts have drawn
attention to the fact that merging firms generally focused on different
Figure C.1. Distribution of HHI Changes
Table C.1. Estimates Based on the HHI Index
DV: log (price)
HHI 4.351***
(1.131)
HHI_weekend −6.548***
(0.902)
Number of observations 11,050
Number of clusters 473
Adjusted R2 0.706
Notes. Figures indicate results of ordinary least squares regression
where the dependent variable is ln(daily rental rate). The HHI is
scaled from zero to one. Themodel controls for time-of-week interacted
monthly passenger traffic and includes car type × rental period and
firm × rental period fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the airport × firm level.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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customer niches, and with consolidation, “each big company is now
competing against the others in all segments of the market” (DePillis
2013).
7With upward-sloping price response curves, rivals would revise
prices in the same direction as the merged firm(s). Accordingly, the
presence of the affiliate firm is expected to cause a decrease in all
players’ prices.
8 In counting the number of affiliate firms in the market, we do not
distinguish between own and other players’ affiliates. We do not find
a statistically significant difference between these when we allow for
differential effects. This is in line with the previous merger literature,
which finds nonmerging firms’ price movements to closely parallel
that of merging firms (Kim and Singal 1993, Ashenfelter et al. 2015,
Miller and Weinberg 2017).
9This is similar to Ashenfelter et al. (2015) and Miller and Weinberg
(2017), which allow product × region fixed effects in their analysis of
the price effects of the Miller and Coors merger in the beer industry.
10Because of this control, our findings do not reflect the overall ef-
ficiency gains that may benefit the firm as a whole and are only
indicative of branch-level changes.
11We assume away collusive pricing. With collusion, price may be
above marginal cost (Δd> 0) yet not responsive to the number of
competitors in the market.
12Airport locations account for 55% of the U.S. car rental market
(Bachman 2016).
13 In our sample period from 2005 to 2016, the composition of cus-
tomers booking online may have changed, potentially implying
variation in average price sensitivity. To the extent that this variation
is common across airports, rental period fixed effects in our re-
gressions would control for this confound.
14As each year’s data comes from a different calendar month, we
control for time-of-year differences in the demand for different
firms and car types through rental-period–interacted fixed effects
of these variables.
15To obtain an average daily rental price for the weekend period, we
divide the three-day rental fee by three.
16 Figure 4 plots average market prices. We obtain the same pattern
with disaggregate firm-level data (Figure A.2).
17 Separate regression results for different car types are presented in
Table B.3.
18Previous merger studies from the airline industry (Borenstein 1990,
Kim and Singal 1993) report weighted as well as unweighted re-
gression results as, in that industry, carrier-route–level passenger
traffic data are available. Although we have data on passenger traffic
at the airport level, the unavailability of data on the relative share
for the different firms and car types precludes us from applying
proper weights. At the same time, given that larger airports contain
more firm-/car type–level observations, our sample automatically
places greater weight on airports based on size. Borenstein (1990,
p. 401) mentions that weighting by passenger count is “appropriate
in gauging the impact of price changes on aggregate consumers’
welfare, it is not appropriate for a cross-sectional comparison of
market power.” The purpose of our analysis rather aligns with the
second.
19Alternatively, the same effect can be measured as the price change
from a unit increase in the number of affiliate firms with the market’s
total firm count held constant. Merger price effects we report are
based on this latter specification as it allows us to directly obtain the
standard errors for the estimated effect.
20Not accounting for these unobserved factors may cause upward
bias in our estimates as they would be positively correlated with firm
count.
21Three airports listed inmarket share data (Miami, Sanford, andWest
Palm Beach) are not covered in our price panel. Nine other airports
observe entries/exits by at least one of the top firms mentioned herein
(Tampa, San Antonio, Albuquerque, Washington National, Oakland,
Sacramento, Orange County, Newark, New York JFK, New York
LGA). For this latter set of airports, we preferred to refrain from
making additional assumptions to determine how the exiting firm’s
share would be reallocated among remaining (affiliate and rival)
firms.
22The price effect is calculated as 0.029500 × (4.351) for the weekday
and 0.029500 × (−6.548 + 4.351) for the weekend period. Note that
these estimates may overestimate mergers’ average price effects as, in
this exercise, we neglect the impact of smaller firms in obtaining the
HHI measures.
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